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RESPONSE
SHOULD PROPERTY SCHOLARS EMBRACE
VIRTUE ETHICS? A SKEPTICAL COMMENT
Katrina M. Wymant
INTRODUCTION

Land Virtues' is a timely appeal to adopt a new normative framework to guide land-use regulation. As I write, policymakers in Washington are busily abandoning long-standing policy approaches in a
desperate attempt to minimize the damage from what many are calling the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. 2 As stock
prices crumble and credit becomes harder to access, deregulation and
faith in the free market have gone out the window, and the federal
government has bailed out, nationalized, re-regulated, and brokered
3
the sale of some of the country's most well known financial firms.
These actions have prompted many analysts to argue that the antiregulatory and small-government ethos that has dominated public
policy since Ronald Reagan's presidency is giving way to new support
4
for regulation and bigger government.
t Professor, New York University School of Law. I received helpful comments on this
Response at a summer workshop at NYU School of Law. Thanks also to Lisa Austin, Eric
Claeys, Moshe Halbertal, Robert Howse, and Lewis Kornhauser for insights they offered as
I was thinking about the many questions that Land Virtues raises, and to David Lametti and
Eduardo Pefialver for reviewing a draft of this Response. Allison Welch provided helpful
research assistance. The editors of the Cornell Law Review offered useful suggestions
throughout the editing process.
1

Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).

2 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, U.S. May Take Ownership Stake in
Banks to Ease Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at Al; Mark Landler & Edmund L.
Andrews, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at
Al.
3 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near
Failure,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al; Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank
Failure, US. Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al;Joe Nocera, 36 Hours ofAlarm
and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at Al.
4 See, e.g., Tim Arango & Julie Creswell, Goodbye to All That, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008,
at BUI; Alex Berenson, Power Plays: How Free Should a Free Market Be?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2008, at WK1 ("Whoever becomes president in January, lawmakers will be under pressure
to strengthen financial regulation and give more resources to agencies like the Food and
Drug Administration, which have appeared overwhelmed in recent years."); Bob Davis et
al., Unraveling Reagan: Amid Turmoil, U.S. Turns Away from Decades of Deregulation,WALL ST.
J., July 25, 2008, at Al; Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at Al.
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Written well before the current financial crisis, Land Virtues calls
on scholars to abandon intellectual theories often thought to justify
the faith in free markets that policymakers currently are jettisoning
and to embrace an explicitly ethical framework to guide policymaking
about land use. While Professor Pefialver does not describe his project in Kuhnian terms,5 Land Virtues seeks to launch a revolution in
property scholarship 6 that would supplant the dominant economic
paradigm 7 and replace it with an approach rooted in virtue ethics.
Will property scholars be as open as economic policymakers have
been recently to abandoning longstanding ideas and adopting a new
intellectual perspective? Only time will tell what, if any, impact the
dramatic events of recent months will have in legal academic circles.
In this Response I pursue what I hope is a more fruitful question for
academic inquiry, namely whether property scholars should follow
Pefialver's recommendations and embrace virtue ethics as a normative
guide. I start by critically analyzing Pefialver's objections to economic
analysis of law. I then identify four questions that Pefialver and other
proponents of using virtue ethics as a normative guide in making public policy will need to confront to advance their case. I am skeptical
that virtue ethics offers an attractive or a feasible framework to guide
land use or other forms of regulation at this stage. But I applaud
Pefialver's effort to resurrect the ancient tradition of thinking about
property as an instrument for promoting certain character traits. The
idea of using property law to foster virtue raises many fascinating questions for modern property theorists and is well worth further analysis.
I
PE$JALVER'S

CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Pefialver's main argument for a virtue ethics-inspired approach
to land-use policy is what he sees as the inadequacy of the dominant
economic paradigm for analyzing land-use law. What seems to bother
Pefialver most about this paradigm is the normative economic claim
that law should be structured to maximize individual well-being,
which he understands as a prescription for designing law to maximize
5
The reference is to THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(3d ed. 1996).
6 1 use "property" to refer principally to land and therefore use the terms "property
law" and "land law" synonymously. As the title Land Virtues implies, Pefialver's article is
concerned mainly with the paradigm for land law, and when he uses the term "property"
he seems to have land in mind. However, itseems to me that Pefialver's concerns with
economic analysis apply beyond its application to land (or property) law and encompass its
use in public policy generally. In theory, virtue ethics could be used to guide policy in
many fields in addition to land (or property) law.
7
In Kuhn's terms, paradigms "provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research." KUHN, supra note 5, at 10.
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something like wealth or individual preferences. Thus, Pefialver suggests that there are "independent reasons for resisting" the idea that
landowners should be encouraged to single-mindedly seek to maximize their land values. 8 He warns that "[t]o assume that wealth or
welfare maximization-or, for that matter, maximization of any single
value-is the ultimate, or even the most important, goal of land-use
decisions is to beg some crucial and contentious questions."9 What
attracts Pefialver to virtue ethics is the alternative and more expansive
normative framework that he argues virtue ethics offers to guide landuse policy. Pefialver "calls for resort to a broadermoral framework, one
that is sufficiently capacious to encompass the value of personhood,
the demands of liberty, and the important goal of enhanced social
welfare." 10 In his view, "A theory of owner obligation rooted in the
Aristotelian tradition provides such an inclusive vision."" Elsewhere
he explains that "virtue theory is able to explain why consequences for
human beings' material well-being ought to matter for land-use decision makers without adopting the position that those consequences
12
are the only important moral considerations."
Strangely, even though he seems to object to economic analysis
because of the normative economic claim, Pefialver does not spend
much time explaining why he is uncomfortable with the idea that policy should be structured to promote individual preferences or wealth.
Pefialver's critiques of economic analysis instead focus first on the behavioral claim central to positive economic analysis-that individuals
seek to maximize something like market value, wealth, or their preferences-and second on the policy preference of some legal economists
for limited government involvement in land-use regulation. It is hard
to figure out why Pefialver believes that these two critiques set the
stage for embracing virtue ethics. He does not suggest that virtue ethics is inherently more predisposed than economic analysis to more
government involvement in land use. 13 Nor does he argue that virtue
ethics presupposes a richer model of human behavior than economic

8

Pefialver, supra note 1, at 841.

9

Id. at 860.

10

Id. at 863.

11
12

Id.
Id. at 868.

13
See id. at 872-73 ("It bears emphasizing that rejecting welfare-maximizing theories
of landowner obligation in favor of a virtue-based approach does not lead to an embrace of
unrelentingly collective or statist decision making about land use. Even where we reach
the conclusion that landowners' self-interested calculations should give way to overriding
moral considerations, the question whether to enforce coercively the demands of virtue
through the force of law will turn, as virtue theorists have long understood, on a number of
considerations." (footnote omitted)).
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analysis. 1 4 Moreover, neither of these critiques is as devastating to economic analysis as Pefialver supposes.
Let's begin with the first critique, that economic analysis of land
use is problematic because it starts from the premise that owners seek
to maximize the market value of their land or their wealth. 15 According to Pefialver, the picture is more complicated, as people often
value land not only for monetary but also for non-monetary reasons. 16
One problem with his critique is that many legal economists probably
agree that there are a multitude of reasons why people value land. As
Land Virtues acknowledges in a few places, economically oriented
scholars often define the value individuals seek to maximize not as
wealth but as a general unit like welfare that can encompass monetary
as well as non-monetary goods. 17 Moreover, Pefialver's first critique is
hardly fatal even if it is valid. Economic analysts could respond by
empirically examining what property owners seek to maximize and
then updating their assumptions about what owners value.' 8 Indeed,
economic analysis of law scholarship has taken a noticeable empirical
turn in the past decade. Think of the emergence of the Society for
Empirical Legal Studies, the JournalofEmpirical Legal Studies in 2004,19
14 Pefialver suggests that virtue ethics is compatible "with a range of models of human
behavior." Id. at 867-68.
15 See id. at 823-25, 833.
16 See id. at 832, 834-35, 837-38, 840.
17
See id. at 824 ("[A] number of contemporary legal economists, most prominently
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, have constructed their legal theories around the maximization of 'welfare,' a category of value that they understand to be significantly broader
than 'wealth' and, indeed, to encompass anything and everything that people might
desire.").
Sometimes when Pefialver recognizes that economic analysts define the value being
maximized in broader terms, he introduces a new critique, namely that economic analysis
is less useful when it assumes that owners seek to maximize something abstract like welfare.
See id. at 835 n.54 (referring to "[t]he difficulties of measuring such an open-ended conception of value (or welfare or utility)"). This is a version of the well-known indeterminacy
critique of economic analysis. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv.
1051, 1067-68 (2000) (discussing the inadequacy of thin versions of rational-choice theory). This critique makes the valid point that since values such as utility or welfare are
often unknowable by outsiders, economic claims that individuals seek to maximize values
such as utility or welfare are difficult to test and hence to falsify. See id.; see also Robert C.
Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critiqueof ClassicalLaw and
Economics, 65 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989) (discussing Arthur Leff's argument in his
1974 review of Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law that "because a person's received
utility is unobservable, the assumption of rational utility-maximization is strictly
nonfalsifiable").
18 Korobkin and Ulen make the same suggestion with regard to the economic analysis
of law generally. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1075 ("The answer, we believe, is
to ... develop[ ] a more subtle, textured understanding of how actors make decisions in
various situations, relying extensively on empirical data.").
19 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, http://www.wiley.com/bw/aims.asp?ref=17401453&site=l (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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and the annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, held for the
third time in 2008.20 The empirical research these institutions are
showcasing and promoting has the potential to address Pefialver's
concerns about the shakiness of the behavioral assumptions underly2
ing economic analysis of law. '
Professor Pefialver's second critique concerns the policy preference of some legal economists for limited government regulation of
land use. 22 Pefialver seems to understand this position as being
rooted in a normative belief that the policy goal should be to maximize the value of land, and a positive assumption that landowners are
better able than government to achieve this goal because they are better informed and more motivated to maximize land values than distant government decision makers.2 3 As I mentioned above, Pefialver
dislikes the idea that policy should be structured to maximize land
values or wealth, but he does not clearly explain why. On the other
hand, he does offer several reasons for doubting the positive claim
24
that landowners will do a good job of maximizing land values. Ultimately, he emphasizes that whether private or public decision makers
will do a better job of maximizing land values is an empirical
question.

25

What is puzzling about Pefialver's second critique is its underlying premise that the value of economic analysis depends (at least
partly) on the strength of the policy prescriptions generated by some
legal economists. The fact that some legal economists have used economic ideas to derive policy recommendations that may-or may
not-be problematic says nothing about the overall value of economic
analysis. These legal economists simply could have misapplied the
theory. Indeed, given that Pefialver opposes economic analysis partly
because some legal economists argue for very little public decision
making about land use, it is noteworthy that there are economically
oriented scholars who maintain that economic analysis, when properly
20 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/society.
asp?ref=1740-1453&site=1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
21 Indeed, Pefialver is careful to underscore that his critique that economic analysis
presumes an overly simplified model of human motivation would not apply to analyses that
draw on behavioral economics or new institutional economics. Pefialver, supra note 1, at
824-25.
22 See id. at 826, Part II.B.2.
See, e.g.,
id. at 848 (referring to "the normative dimension of the Demsetzian view of
23
the incentives created by land's market value").
Pefialver offers two reasons for doubting that private decision makers will necessa24
rily make decisions that will maximize land values. In analyzing their options, private decision makers may not value goods that are not commonly traded in the market, "such as the
health of wetlands and ecosystems, the extinction of species, or housing for the homeless."
Id. at 850. In addition, private landowners may not consider the impacts of their decisions
on future generations or heavily discount the future if they do consider it. See id. at 854.
25 See id. at 857-58.
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applied, justifies a lot more government regulation than conventionally assumed. For example, in a recent book, Retaking Rationality,
Richard Revesz, Dean of New York University School of Law, and his
co-author Michael Livermore argue that "[c]ost-benefit analysis...
can be an enormously powerful tool for proregulatory groups. It can
show that the interests they represent-the environment, consumers,
or workers-are not opposed to the economy. '26 Revesz and
Livermore maintain that progressive groups should stop allowing opponents to dominate debates about how cost-benefit analysis is done
and instead take an active role in these debates in order to rid it of
anti-regulatory biases that, they emphasize, are not inherent to the
exercise. 2 7 Retaking Rationalityhelpfully reminds us that the policy implications of economic analysis are far less determinate than many opponents and proponents of regulation imagine.
In general, Pefialver's critiques of economic analysis are somewhat mystifying. As I indicated above, a dislike for the normative economic claim that policy should be structured to maximize something
like individual well-being or wealth seems to drive much of Pefialver's
discomfort with economic analysis. But he does not address in much
detail why he objects to this claim, which-as he acknowledges-has
already been widely criticized for decades. 28 His criticisms of the behavioral claim and policy prescriptions offered by some legal economists do not, in my view, highlight any inherent flaws in economic
analysis that warrant great unease.
Indeed, even though he tries to set the stage for a virtue ethics-inspired approach to property by criticizing economic analysis,
Pefialver recognizes that positive economic analysis has much to offer
virtue ethicists like him. 29 The normative economic claim central to

Pefialver's discomfort with economic analysis-that policy should be
structured to promote something like individual well-being or
wealth-was central to early economic analysis of law, and some prominent scholars still advance it today.3 0 But by and large contemporary
26
RICHARD L. REVEsZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETrER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 18 (2008).

27

See id. at 10 ("This book challenges the liberal camp to rethink its position on cost-

benefit analysis .... [B]iases [against regulation] are not inherent to the methodology [of
cost-benefit analysis]. If those biases were identified and eliminated, cost-benefit analysis
would become a powerful tool for neutral policy analysis.").
28
See Pefialver, supra note 1, at 823 & n.5 (noting that "[t]he literature critiquing law

and economics is vast and rich" and citing "a few prominent examples").
29
See, e.g., id. at 827-28, 872, 873-74.
30
For example, Richard Posner's early classic, Economic Analysis of Law, intermixed
normative and positive analysis. RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 1.2
(1972). More recently, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell attracted considerable attention
among legal academics with their normative claim that the law should be designed to maximize individual well-being. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 RARv. L. REv. 961, 967 (2001) ("Our central claim is that the welfare-based normative
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legal economists are practitioners of positive economic analysis of law,
and they are increasingly using sophisticated theoretical and empirical tools to analyze the consequences of existing and proposed legal
rules. The growth of empirical legal studies is evidence of this analytical orientation. Going forward, scholars could deploy positive economic analysis to predict whether policies intended to foster virtues
would achieve these results, and to retrospectively assess whether virtue ethics-inspired property law was in fact producing the intended
consequences. In my view, rather than critiquing economic analysis as
Part II of Land Virtues does, virtue ethicists such as Pefialver who want
to use virtue ethics to guide public policy should focus on elaborating
the article's embryonic ideas for enlisting positive economic analysis
to achieve their normative objectives. 3 1 For public-policy minded virtue ethicists, co-option is likely to be a more promising posture to take
toward positive (if not normative) economic analysis than antagonism.
II
FOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT VIRTUE ETHICS

The most intriguing aspect of Land Virtues is its proposal to use
virtue ethics as a normative framework for developing land-use policy.
As I mentioned earlier, virtue ethics appeals to Pefialver principally
because he interprets it as urging policymakers to promote a broad
range of consequences, including "personhood," "liberty," and "social
welfare," 32 with the ultimate objective of "fostering human flourishing."'33 Land Virtues discusses three virtues that land law should promote in the service of fostering human flourishing, while alluding to
the potential to use property to foster other virtues as well:3 4 "indus36
try,"3 5 because "[m]aterial wealth is crucial to human flourishing;
'justice,"37 or sharing "surplus property with those [in need] . . .in
approach should be exclusively employed in evaluating legal rules. That is, legal rules
should be selected entirely with respect to their effects on the well-being of individuals in
society.").
31
See, e.g., Pefialver, supra note 1,at 827-28, 872, 873-74.
32
In three sentences that I already have quoted in part, Pefialver states:
The challenge for property and land-use theorists is to find a way to put the
valuable tools of economic analysis to use [within land-use discussions]
while restricting the normative ambition of those tools to their proper domain. Meeting this challenge calls for resort to a broadermoral framework,
one that is sufficiently capacious to encompass the value of personhood,
the demands of liberty, and the important goal of enhanced social welfare.
A theory of owner obligation rooted in the Aristotelian tradition provides
such an inclusive vision.
Id. at 863.
33

Id. at 882.

34
35

Id. at 876-77.
Id. at 877.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 880.
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order to satisfy more fundamental needs;" 38 and "humility,"39 defined
40
as using land in a precautionary way to avoid irreversible damage.
It is important to recognize that the idea that property could promote virtue and hence human flourishing has ancient roots. In an
informative draft article, David Lametti analyzes the social functions
that Aristotle, Cicero, and Thomas Aquinas posited for private property. 4 1 Lametti argues that each of them saw private property as promoting certain virtues that in turn served to promote an overall good.
Aristotle, for instance, regarded owning private property as one means
of "cultivat[ing] the virtues of moderation and liberality" 42 provided
property was used consistently with these virtues. He envisioned the
ethical development that private property promoted within individuals helping the city flourish, and the city's flourishing contributing to
human flourishing (eudaimonia) within individuals. 43 Thomas Aquinas embedded private property within an explicitly Christian teleology. 44 Like Aristotle, he envisioned property as a means of fostering
virtues, adding "[c] harity, generosity, sharing and stewardship" to the
list of virtues it promotes if properly used. 45 Aquinas's overall goal was
similar to Aristotle's-to foster human development in order to
achieve a broader goal-but he defined it in religious terms as "the
Good life which is God's will for human beings. '46 In Land Virtues,
Pefialver, who is well aware of these traditions, is consciously reviving
the idea of private property as a tool for promoting certain virtues to
achieve a broader vision. The human flourishing that Pefialver argues
that law should promote is a secular version of the "Good life" that is
the endpoint in Aquinas's teleology, or an updated version of Aris47
totle's concept of eudaimonia.
How does Pefialver's idea of structuring property law to promote
virtue and human flourishing compare to more modern and familiar
38
39

Id.

45

Id.

Id. at 884.
40 See id. at 885.
41 David Lametti, The Objects of Virtue (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
42
Id. at 11.
43 See id. at 14 ("The virtue in the city is founded on the virtue of individuals and
virtue of individuals is based on the virtue of the city. Each forms the other through laws
and education, and the actions of virtuous individuals leading to a virtuous state of character aimed at the good."). On the meaning of eudaimonia, see Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and
Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 902 (2009).
44 See Lametti, supra note 41, at 38.
46 Id. See also id. (arguing that for Aquinas, "private property is an instrumental good
(analogous to utility) but in the service of human development (dignity, development)
within a Christian framework").
47 Pefialver describes his purpose as "to reintroduce the Aristotelian ethical tradition
into discussions of property and land-use as an approach with much to offer." Pefialver,
supra note 1, at 864.
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understandings of property? Land Virtues suggests that, like many economic analysts, Pefialver is a consequentialist who believes that law
and policy should be adopted or retained based on their implications
for human beings. But he rejects the normative economic claim that
law should promote only a single value, such as wealth or welfare, and
instead favors the pursuit of "a plurality of values." 48 Furthermore,
Pefialver rejects the idea embedded in much normative economic theory that the ends to which the law should aspire must correlate with
what individuals subjectively believe to be in their interests. When
scholars like Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policies
"should be selected entirely" based on "their effects on the well-being
of individuals, ' 49 they mean that policies should be evaluated based
on their effects on what individuals "really care about,"50 not based on
51
what analysts think individuals actually or should care about.
Pefialver, like other virtue ethicists, maintains that the law should aim
to promote a series of ends that are objectively valuable as determined
by a normative framework independent of individual preferences or
52
desires.
Professor Pefialver's belief that legal rules should be structured to
promote an objectively determined concept of flourishing puts him in
the company of scholars who believe that social policy should pro53
mote well-being, but define it using objective theories of well-being.
His preferred normative framework for policy also resembles the capaId. at 867.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 30, at 967.
Id. at 980 n.35.
See id. at 983-85, 1339-42 (arguing that the "moral force and appeal of welfare
economics" comes from the fact that it promotes a person's actual well-being instead of
"some hypothetical notion of satisfaction"); id. at 1346 ("Under a welfare economic analysis, any actual preference is given weight because it reflects an individual's actual wellbeing; there is no a priori basis under welfare economics for ignoring certain preferences."). However, Kaplow and Shavell do not support giving weight to individual preferences based on imperfect information. See id. at 1331.
52 Pefialver, supra note 1, at 866 ("[V]irtue ethicists typically derive the content of
their accounts of the virtues from an objective conception of what it means to live well or
flourish in a distinctively human way."); id. ("Depending on the theorist, the conceptions
of the well-lived human life underlying virtue ethics will have varying degrees of thickness
and content. Virtue theories agree, however, in this focus on flourishing and in refusing to
assign value to some state of affairs merely because an individual happens subjectively to
desire or prefer it." (footnote omitted)); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court,
2006 Term-Forward: Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perceptions"Against Lofty Formalism, 121
HARv. L. REV. 5, 14 (2007) ("The [capabilities approach] focuses on what people are actually able to do and be, not on whether their desires are satisfied. Desire is a malleable and
inconstant element of people's lives.").
53 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir is the leading exponent of a welfarist approach to property law that relies on an objective, rather than a subjective, definition of well-being. See
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669, 1673 (2003) ("[A]ny adequate criterion of welfare must consist of
strong objective components.").
48

49
50
51
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bilities approach promoted by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 54
Under this approach, policy should be structured to allow individuals
to enjoy freedoms that are objectively vital to enjoying a good quality
of life. 55 Where Land Virtues departs from objective theories of wellbeing and capability theory is in the prominence it accords to using
the law to promote virtue. Pefialver does not simply suggest that land
law should seek to promote a plurality of objectively desirable ends.
He argues for using law to promote virtue in order to achieve these
ends.
Thus, the crux of Land Virtues's contribution to contemporary
theorizing about property-and law in general-is its explicit argument that law, particularly land law, should be structured to promote
certain virtues. The ultimate goal of fostering these virtues is to promote an objectively desirable endpoint not too dissimilar from the
endpoints favored by objective theories of well-being and capability
theories. 56 In resurrecting an ancient idea that property should be
regarded as a means of fostering virtue, Land Virtues leaves us with a
thoughtful and challenging question: Should land law-which is
Pefialver's main focus-be structured to promote virtue? I am skeptical that it should be but nonetheless intrigued by the idea. What follows are four questions that I think Pefialver needs to address before
his argument for a virtue ethics-inspired approach to land law will
gain much traction.
Question #1: Does the goal of promoting virtue, which underlies virtue
ethics, make sense given that experimental psychology suggests that people are
situationally ratherthan globally ethical?
My first concern with using land law to promote virtue has nothing to do with the idea of deploying land law-or any other kind of
law-in this way, but rather with the idea central to virtue ethics that
individuals should aspire to be virtuous. In promoting virtue, virtue
54
See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 10 n.7 (listing sources explaining Nussbaum's
and Sen's capabilities approaches and the differences between their approaches). Nussbaum provides a useful overview of her capabilities approach. See id. at 10-16. Gregory
Alexander's article The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law argues that property
law does and should embody a commitment to promoting human flourishing as capability
theorists such as Sen and Nussbaum define the concept. 94 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 751
(2009). Another article applying Sen's capability theory to property law, with a different
goal than Alexander's, is Jedediah Purdy's A Freedom-PromotingApproach to Property: A Renewed Traditionfor New Debates, 72 U. Cni. L. REv. 1237, 1242-44 (2005).
55
Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 11 (arguing that under the capabilities approach, "government is charged with securing for citizens a comprehensive set of necessary conditions
for a life worthy of human dignity"); id. at 12 ("Government ought to give people a full and
meaningful choice; at that point, the decision whether to take up a given opportunity must
be their own.").
56
See, e.g., id. at 10 (arguing that the end point of the capabilities approach is to
support "human beings in the development and exercise of some central human
abilities").
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ethicists are not simply promoting good deeds. Virtue has a specific
meaning in virtue ethics. As Pefialver explains, drawing on the scholarship of other virtue ethicists,
[v]irtues are acquired, stable dispositions to engage in certain characteristic modes of behavior that are conducive to human flourishing. . . . For example, a person who has the virtue of courage
possesses a stable disposition to behave in certain characteristically
brave ways in a broad range of situations where those lacking the
57
virtue would flee.
In a very interesting new book, Experiments in Ethics, Kwame
Anthony Appiah asks whether the goal of fostering virtue makes sense
given the findings of experimental psychology about why human beings behave as they do.58 As Appiah explains, many virtue ethicists
believe that we should be seeking to acquire virtues, meaning, as
Pefialver's definition of virtue underscores, "stable dispositions." 59
But social psychologists "find that character traits simply don't exhibit
(in the current argot) cross-situational stability." 60 Appiah elaborates:
These psychologists are not globalists but "situationists": they
claim.., that a lot of what people do is best explained not by traits
of character but by systematic human tendencies to respond to features of their situations that nobody previously thought to be crucial
at all. They think that someone who is, say, reliably honest in one
kind of situation will often be reliably dishonest in another. They'd
predict that Oskar Schindler was mercenary, arrogant, hypocritical,
and calculating sometimes . . . but not always; and that his courage
and compassion could be elicited in some contexts but not in
61
others.
Experimental psychology shows that people exhibit "huge differences
in behavior ... from differences in circumstances that seem of little
normative consequence. ' 62 For example, a 1972 study "found that
when you dropped your papers outside a phone booth in a shopping
mall, you were far more likely to be helped by people if they had just
had the good fortune of finding a dime in the phone's coin-return
slot."63 A 1994 study "showed that you were more likely to get change
57
58

Pefialver, supra note 1, at 864.
KWAME ANTHoNY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS

IN

ETHICS 38-39 (2008). Rob Howse drew

my attention to the chapter in the book on virtue ethics.
59
Id. at 38 (describing the reality that "most people simply [don't] display such multitrack, context-independent dispositions"); Pefialver, supra note 1, at 864.
60

APPIAH,

supra note 58, at 39.

Id. (second ellipsis in original) (foomote omitted).
62
Id. at 41.
63
Id. (referring to Alice M. Isen & Paula F. Levin, The Effect of Feeling Good on Helping:
Cookies and Kindness, 21 J. PERSONALInv & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1972)).
61
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for a dollar outside a fragrant bakery shop than standing near a 'neu64
tral-smelling dry-goods store.'
As Appiah indicates, the social-science research he discusses
raises an obvious question for virtue ethics: Does it make sense to
speak of fostering virtue given the significant impact of circumstantial
factors on how people behave? 6 5 Maybe it would be better to try to
induce desirable conduct by changing the circumstances in which
people act-for example, by increasing people's "capacities and resources"-than by attempting to foster virtue. 66 It is possible that
Pefialver and others have a convincing response to the social-psychology research that would reaffirm the relevance of using law to promote virtue. Indeed, after reviewing a draft of this Response, Pefialver
graciously e-mailed me two very interesting articles that argue that virtue ethics survives the social-psychological research discussed by Appiah and others. 67 But at any rate, Pefialver and other proponents of
using law to promote virtue need to offer some reassurance that virtue
ethics is worth embracing given the challenge that social psychology
seems to offer to the assumption-central to most virtue ethics-that
it is possible to foster "stable dispositions" in human beings.
Question #2: Is it consistent with virtue ethics's concept of virtue to use
law to promote virtue?
Assume that proponents of using law to promote virtue can offer
a convincing argument for trying to foster virtue. Another issue the
proponents of using law to promote virtue need to address is whether
law truly can be used to promote virtue as virtue ethicists understand
the concept. Or is using law to promote virtue incompatible with the
68
idea of virtue central to virtue ethics?

As mentioned above, virtue ethics has a particular concept of virtue in mind, one aspect of which is that virtues are "stable dispositions." Another idea central to virtue ethics is that
[v]irtues do not consist simply of acquired dispositions to engage in
certain external actions. They are far deeper character traits that, in
64 Id. (citing Robert A. Baron & Jill Thormley, A Whiff of Reality: Positive Affect as a
PotentialMediator of the Effects of PleasantFragranceson Task Performanceand Helping,26 ENV'T
& BEHAV. 766 (1994)).
65 Id. at 46 ("There are some philosophers ... who take the social-science literature
about character and conduct to pose a serious and perhaps lethal challenge to the virtue
ethicist's worldview. Talk all you like about virtuous dispositions, the challenge goes: we're
just not built that way.").
66
Id. at 71 (suggesting that in light of the situation's importance the best solution is
to "promulgate the circumstances in which our excellences can be elicited").
67 John Sabini & Maury Silver, Lack of Character?Situationism Critiqued, 115 ETHICS 535
(2005); Gopal Sreenivasan, ErrorsAbout Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution, 111 MIND
441 (2002).
68 Thanks to Lisa Austin for highlighting for me the possibility that law may not be
compatible with promoting virtue as virtue ethicists understand the concept.
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addition to manifesting themselves in specific actions, are bound up
with a person's reasons for taking a particular action as well as her
emotional state as she does so. A person who does the right thing
69
for the wrong reasons is not virtuous.
One example Pefialver gives of doing the right thing for the wrong
reason is doing something because of a prior rule, 70 by which he
seems to mean a moral rule. He explains that
An action is 'brave' and therefore virtuous, not (ultimately) because
it is consistent with a moral rule mandating a particular sort of action under a particular set of circumstances. The action is 'brave'
because it is the sort of action that a brave person would undertake
71
when confronted by that situation.
Here is my question: Can law actually foster virtue if, as virtue
ethicists maintain, it is not virtuous to do the right thing to comply
with a rule? Pefialver does not seem to refer to a possible tension
between using law to promote virtue and the idea central to virtue
ethics that virtue requires acting for the right, meaning internal, reasons. Without mentioning such a dilemma, he argues that one reason
for overriding "private decisions and command [ing] owners to act in
accordance with virtue" is "to constrain the behavior of nonvirtuous
owners and, over time, to teach them to act virtuously of their own
accord."72 But people who change their behavior due to a change in
the law would not seem to be acting virtuously as virtue ethicists understand virtue; they would seem to be doing the right thing (assuming the law is morally justified) for the wrong reasons because their
actions are dictated by external constraints rather than their own internal dispositions.
One possibility, of course, is that individuals who initially change
their behavior in response to law will later act properly for the right
reasons because complying with the law will lead them to internalize
the norm underlying the law. Pefialver identifies Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as an example where using the law to compel people "to act as if they possessed . . .virtue" actually has "foster[ed] virtue" over time by reducing racial discrimination. 73 But can we ever
maintain that people are acting for the right reasons if their change in
behavior ultimately is a response to law? Pefialver and other proponents of using the law to promote virtue need to wrestle more with the
apparent tension between using law to promote virtue and the idea
69 Pefialver, supra note 1, at 864-65 (providing the example of a person who saves a
drowning child solely for the purpose of the acclaim and publicity that the act brings).
70 Id. at 865.
71
Id. (citing ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999)).
72
Id. at 871. See also id. 871 n.207 (citing sources discussing the role of law in promoting virtue).
73
Id. at 871.
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embedded in virtue ethics that individuals are acting virtuously only if
they act for the right, meaning internal, reasons. Perhaps there is a
way of reconciling the use of law to promote virtue with the meaning
74
of virtue in virtue ethics, or at least some theories of virtue ethics.
But greater attention to the tension is warranted as there is no point
in trying to use law to try to promote virtue if using law to achieve it
would defeat the effort.
Question #3: Is using law to promote virtue consistent with society's value
pluralism?
If a legal policymaker is going to use land law or any other kind of
law to promote certain virtues with the long-term goal of fostering
human flourishing, the policymaker must have some concept of what
human flourishing entails to identify the virtues that law must promote. Furthermore, to be consistent with virtue ethics, that concept
of human flourishing must be one that is objectively determined:
human flourishing cannot just be equated with satisfying individual
preferences. As Pefialver explains, "virtue ethicists typically derive the
content of their accounts of the virtues from an objective conception
' 75
of what it means to live well or flourish in a distinctively human way."
As I mentioned above, Land Virtues highlights three virtues that property law should promote, but the article does so without telling us
much about what its preferred endpoint of "human flourishing" entails. 76 One result is that it is difficult to discern why these are virtues
that the law should promote.
There is, though, something faintly disquieting about the idea of
a legal policymaker specifying an objective goal and then using that
goal to select virtues that he or she will structure land law to attain.
One of the attractions of the normative economic claim that legal
rules should be structured to promote individual preferences is that
the promotion of individual preferences is antipaternalistic. 77 Antipaternalistic approaches are attractive in a liberal democratic society
like the United States where we place a high value on allowing individ74 In his response in this issue, Eric Claeys rejects the concern that "when politics
legislates on virtue, it makes it impossible for actors to act virtuously." Claeys, supra note
43, at 921. Later, though, Claeys seems to acknowledge that some virtues probably cannot
be achieved through law, referring specifically to charity. Quoting Robert George, Claeys
states that "legally coerced charity is in an important sense not really charity at all: 'compelling the expressing of gratitude, or the giving of gifts .. .where people ought to express
gratitude [or] give gifts . . .would have the effect of robbing these important practices of
their meaning and value in social life.'" Id. at 944 (quoting ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBER-IES AND PUBLIC MoRALrrT 44 (1993)).
75
Pefialver, supra note 1, at 866.
76
Pefialver acknowledges that "[a] complete virtue theory of property would obviously include (or endorse) a fully elaborated and fully defended account of human flourishing," among other things, and that his article does not include such an account. Id. at
869.
77
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 53, at 1688.

2009]

SHOULD SCHOLARS EMBRACE VIRTUE ETHICS?

1005

uals to pursue their particular conceptions of the good life. 78 Requiring a legal decision maker to articulate an objectively desirable
endpoint that would be the basis for land law could be in tension with
the idea animating our pluralistic society that individuals have wide
79
leeway to pursue their own ways of life.
Pefialver and other proponents of using law to promote virtue
need to address the concern that their project may be-or may be
perceived as-illiberal. Any idea to use law to achieve an objectively
determined goal inevitably runs the risk of this perception. Professor
Nussbaum, for instance, recognizes the threat that the idea of government promoting a concept of human flourishing presents in a pluralistic society. She tries to argue that her capabilities approach avoids
the threat because the approach only requires that people agree "on a
group of capabilities as worthy of being promoted for all citizens in a
pluralistic society." 80 She insists that the approach does not require
81 I
that people agree on "a comprehensive view of the good life."
think that Nussbaum understates the agreement about fundamental
issues that implementing the capabilities approach would require.
Coming up with a list of the basic capabilities or freedoms that all
individuals should inevitably enjoy would presuppose a shared sense
of what it means to live a dignified life. Pefialver and other advocates
of using law to promote virtue with the ultimate goal of achieving
human flourishing need to acknowledge and discuss the potential inconsistency between their project and liberal commitments to encouraging individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good life. I
am not suggesting that Pefialver or others could not come up with
answers to this concern. For example, there might institutional mechanisms for legitimately defining the overarching goal and the requisite
virtues for achieving that goal. But virtue ethicists should, at the very
least, acknowledge the issue.

78 There are, of course, downsides to structuring law to promote individual preference satisfaction. For example, an individual's preferences may not be in her interests if
her preferences arise from a lack of information or societal inequalities. For an overview
of the problems often identified with preference theories of well-being, see id. at 1677-86.
79 In his response in this issue, Professor Claeys eloquently discusses the dangers of a
politics focused on virtue, warning that "[w] hen politics is about legislating virtue and not
about securing rights, it tempts sectarian believers to gain political power to compel subjects to be virtuous as defined by the teachings of their particular sect." Claeys, supra note
43, at 926.
80 Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 14 n.13.
81 Id.; see also id. at 20 ("The [capabilities approach] .. .is quite abstemious: it identifies a very short list of core entitlements that should be secured to all citizens as the basic
entitlements of a just society. Beyond that short list, the [capabilities approach] does not
make sweeping claims about the overall good. It allows people to make their own choices
based on their different views of the good life.").
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Question #4: Mhat is the payoff for property law?
Land Virtues makes an important contribution in resurrecting the
idea of using property to promote virtue with the ultimate objective of
encouraging human flourishing. It also goes further than just raising
the idea of using property law in this way by identifying a number of
virtues that property law could promote. But Professor Pefialver is
largely silent about what exactly structuring land law to promote these
three virtues and through them human flourishing would mean for
the details of specific legal rules.8 2 I suspect that Pefialver or others
will need to explain how property law would differ if it explicitly
aimed to foster virtue before the idea of a virtue ethics-inspired approach to property will gain much of a following.
As Pefialver suggests at various points, contemporary American
property law already promotes virtue, although this is by no means its
sole function. For example, Pefialver argues, the institution of private
property could be regarded "as an elaborate system of indirect morals
legislation ... whose principal goal is to encourage people to cultivate
the virtue of industry... by offering landowners the reward of a privileged claim over the fruits of their labor."8 3 If property law already
implicitly promotes virtue to some degree, how would the legal rules
governing property change if we explicitly sought to structure property law to foster the virtues of industry, justice, and humility to allow
humans to flourish? To take two issues that have preoccupied property scholars recently, what would a virtue ethics-inspired approach
imply for how the public use requirement in the Takings Clause
should be interpreted, and how compensation for eminent domain
should be calculated? Or, to raise an issue that is currently preoccupying policymakers, what would a virtue ethics-inspired approach suggest about whether the government should assist homeowners who
face foreclosure, and if so how any assistance should be structured?8 4
Pefialver would have a stronger case for using virtue ethics as a normative guide to structuring property law if he could demonstrate that
doing so would yield concrete payoffs for the law.
CONCLUSION

I started this Response by comparing the change that Professor
Pefialver is urging property scholars to make in their normative framework to the shift that economic policymakers have recently made to
82 The only concrete implication Pefialver mentions is that using land law to promote
'justice" might require more "redistribution of land rights via in-kind transfers of ownership or occupancy." Pefialver, supra note 1, at 882.
83
Id. at 878.
84 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Edmund L. Andrews, $275 Billion Plan Seeks to Address Crisis in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at Al.
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deal with the financial crisis. The comparison, of course, is inexact.
But there is an underlying similarity between Pefialver's aim-to have
property scholars adopt a plurality of goals for property law in which
the pursuit of wealth would be only one objective-and the recent
focus of economic policymakers on reining in the naked pursuit of
self-interest and addressing its negative consequences. Both
Pefialver's academic project and the policymakers' concrete task start
from the same premise-that individuals should not be left completely alone to pursue their self-interest. As a New York Times colum85
nist succinctly put it: "Greed, to put it mildly, is no longer good."
The virtues ofjustice and humility seem to be making a bit of a comeback, at least at the rhetorical level. These developments suggest that
Pefialver's effort to revive the idea of using law to promote a range of
virtues is not only intellectually intriguing, but also relevant to the
times in which we are living. While there are a number of questions
that he probably needs to address before his project will gain much of
a following, Pefialver deserves credit for his attempt to articulate a
modern framework for using property to promote virtue.

85
Peter Steinfels, Modern Market Thinking Has Devalued a Deadly Sin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2008, at A19.
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